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Abstract 
This paper analyses the causes of the Eurozone crisis. In doing so it carefully surveys authors 
from different economic schools of thought. The paper discusses competing explanations for 
European current account imbalances. Remarkably, opposing views on the relative 
importance of cost developments and of demand developments in explaining current account 
imbalances can be found in both heterodox and orthodox economics and there is a remarkable 
variability of policy conclusions. Regarding the assessment of fiscal and monetary policy 
there is a clearer polarisation, with heterodox analysis regarding austerity as unhelpful and 
most of orthodox economics endorsing it. We advocate a post-Keynesian view which holds 
that current account imbalances are not a fundamental cause of the sovereign debt crisis. 
Rather, the economic policy architecture of the Eurozone, which aims at restricting the role of 
fiscal and monetary policy, is the key to understanding the crisis in Europe. 
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1 Introduction 
While the whole world economy was shaken by global financial crisis 2008/09, most 
countries have seen some form of recovery. However, only in the southern European Euro 
member states did the crisis escalate into a prolonged depression; and only in these countries 
did the crisis turn into a sovereign debt crisis. What explains this unique experience of the 
Eurozone? Baldwin and Giavazzi (eds., 2015), in presenting a ‘consensus view’ of the 
Eurozone crisis put large current account imbalances and the associated financial flows at the 
centre of their explanation. In contrast, we will argue that there is in fact a great variety of 
opinions both on the causes of these current account imbalances, and also on whether or not 
they are central to an explanation of the sovereign debt crisis. In our own analysis we put 
fiscal and monetary policies that have been shaped by a neoliberal design at the centre of the 
crisis. This paper, firstly, examines the controversies surrounding European trade imbalances, 
especially the debates about the extent to which these are caused by differing trends in cost-
competitiveness. We provide a survey of different points of view on this issue which have 
been advanced both my orthodox and heterodox economists and demonstrate the political 
implications of these arguments. In attempting to draw a tentative conclusion on the debate 
about unit labour costs and competitiveness we argue that one common strand running 
through the thought of most post-Keynesians (PKs) is that trade balances are not the central 
element in the Eurozone crisis. At the root of this crisis is a build-up of debt which in this 
case partly reflected growing current account imbalances. However, the crux of the matter is 
that there was a financial crisis which hit Europe asymmetrically, and it was the neoliberal 
fiscal and monetary policy regime of the EMU which turned the financial crisis into a 
sovereign debt crisis. The paper hence, secondly, dedicates offers a discussion of monetary 
and fiscal policy in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and its evaluation from 
different theoretical perspectives. 
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EMU came with an economic policy package that is rule bound and has proven exceptionally 
dysfunctional during the crisis. This policy design is inspired by ordoliberalism, a variant of 
neoliberalism, which aims at constraining government intervention. Macroeconomically this 
has an anti-Keynesian logic; government intervention is ultimately regarded as unnecessary. 
The imposition of rigid rules on monetary and fiscal policy and the exposure of government 
finances to market pressures is not an accident, but an integral part of the neoliberal project. 
These constraints have become binding in the crisis, and have prevented national fiscal 
policies from fighting the recession. In fact, they have imposed austerity policies on those 
countries most affected by the crisis. In part this was made possible by the separation of 
monetary and fiscal policy, which has meant that countries facing a sovereign debt crisis did 
not have full central bank support, i.e. they did not have lender of last resort. Only in this 
context could the financial crisis play out as a sovereign debt crisis in Europe, and it was the 
accompanying austerity policies that have turned a recession into the protracted depression 
we observe today. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses analyses of neoliberalism and shows 
how post-Keynesian Economics can contribute to an understanding of its economic impacts. 
It also establishes that neoliberal economic policies played a key role in setting the stage for 
the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Section 3 outlines and 
evaluates differing explanations of the current account imbalances which characterised the 
period prior to the crisis and discusses their political implications. Section 4 evaluates the 
EMU fiscal and monetary policy regime. Based on these discussions, section 5 concludes by 
way of a proposal for an alternative, PK policy package. 
 
2 Neoliberalism, economic policy and growth models  
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Neoliberalism is an attempt to modernise liberal thought and policy after the great wars. 
Theoretically it has modified the conceptualisation of markets, states and individuals 
(Foucault 2008, Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). Politically it encompasses a variety of projects 
that have been shaped by the specific historical constellations and power relations (Harvey 
2005, Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). There has been extensive debate on the nature 
of neoliberalism, in the course of which globalisation, financialisation and rising inequality 
have been identified as key features.
1
 While many discussions of neoliberalism and its 
variegated impact in different countries or regions draw heavily on political science and often 
proceed at a fairly high level of abstraction, post-Keynesian economics (PKE) can offer a 
concrete, detailed and structured analysis of the economic impacts of neoliberalism. 
Financialisation and the effects of income distribution on growth and economic stability have 
long been central themes in PK research (Hein 2012, Stockhammer 2012). PKE thus is 
particularly well-suited to providing economic discussions of neoliberalism. Specifically, we 
will show that the PK typology of growth models can clarify neoliberal variegation in terms 
of demand regimes and highlight the contradictory dynamics of neoliberalisation. We also 
highlight PK analysis of money and finance with lends itself to a theory of debt-driven 
growth. 
 
Table 1 provides a simple framework to analysing the interaction of distribution and growth. 
It classifies growth regimes along two axes: First, the demand regime can be profit-led or 
wage-led, i.e. the effect of an increase in the profit share on effective demand can be positive 
or negative. Second, actual distributional changes can be pro-capital or pro-labour. This 
                                                 
1
 On neoliberalism see Foucault 2008, Harvey 2005, Brenner et al 2010, Duménil and Lévy 2004, Glyn 2006, 
Dardot and Laval 2013; on income distribution see Atkinson et al. 2011 on top incomes and Stockhammer 
2016a on wage shares. 
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simple framework allows for a rich analysis that can be used to compare different economic 
theories as well as different country experiences in specific historic periods. Cell (1,1) depicts 
a constellation of rising inequality in a profit-led demand regime. This would give a profit-led 
growth model, corresponding to the trickle-down economy that many neoliberals of the early 
1980s were propagating. Rising inequality is a healthy thing because it comes with growth, 
which will eventually benefit the poor, at least in absolute terms. This is ‘neoliberalism in 
theory’. 
 
Table 1. A typology of distribution and growth regimes 
  Actual distributional changes 
  Pro-capital Pro-labour 
Demand regime Profit-led Virtuous profit-led 
growth process 
(‘neoliberalism in 
theory) 
Stagnation or 
external demand 
stimulation (‘Failed 
social reform’) 
Wage-led Stagnation or 
external demand 
stimulation, e.g. via 
debt-driven or 
export-driven growth 
(‘actually existing 
neoliberalism’) 
Virtuous wage-led 
growth process 
(‘social 
Keynesianism’) 
Source: adapted from Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013 
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Cell (1,2) has rising wages in a profit-led economy, which will not give rise to a viable 
growth model, but rather to stagnation. It is this scenario that Margret Thatcher was alluding 
to when she said ‘there is no alternative’: social reform is doomed because it cannot generate 
growth. Cell (2,1) combines a wage-led demand regime with rising inequality. This 
combination cannot deliver a stable growth model, but creates a downward pressure on 
demand. However, growth can still occur if there are other stimulants. From a PK view, it is 
this cell were actually existing neoliberalism resides. Stockhammer et al (2009) and Onaran 
and Galanis (2014) provide evidence that the Euro area overall as well as many individual 
countries are in a wage-led demand regime. Growth has thus not been the result of a profit-
led accumulation. Rather, two different growth models have emerged: the Anglo-Saxon and 
southern European countries developed a debt-driven growth model, which was driven by 
increasing household debt, strong consumption demand and, in some cases, a residential 
investment boom. Other countries, especially Germany, adopted an export-driven growth 
model, where domestic demand is weak and growth contributions mostly arise from net 
exports. Thus, neoliberalism has relied on financialisation and globalisation as means for 
demand stimulation. Both growth models which emerged from this process allow for growth, 
but are intrinsically unstable, because they rely on increasing debt to income ratios. It is these 
rising mountains of debt that erupted in the crisis.  
 
So far our analysis has focused on the role of income distribution and demand formation. 
PKE also offers a distinct analysis of the monetary sphere and the impact of finance on (real) 
economic activity (Lavoie 2014). PKE holds that money is central in capitalist economies 
because it is held in part as an insurance against (incalculable) uncertainty. It is a financial 
asset that offers liquidity. As a consequence, in times of financial crisis, the demand for 
money soars and other financial markets may freeze or collapse. Money is created by 
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commercial banks as a side effect of their lending decisions. The financial system is 
underwritten by central bank and government debt as the safest financial assets. Debt and 
money are thus intrinsically linked and national financial markets are founded on state 
authority and government debt as a key asset, even if this will only become apparent in times 
of crisis. Banks’ lending decisions depend critically on expected profits and on the 
availability of collateral. The most important form of collateral for lending to the non-
financial sector is real estate property (Zhang and Bezemer 2015); the most important from of 
collateral for lending to financial institutions is government bonds (Gabor and Ban 2015). In 
the PK view, changes in private debt can be s source of endogenous cycles and economic 
instability both in a downward and an upward direction, in particular in a deregulated 
financial system (Minsky 1986, Charles 2008). Government intervention is seen as vital in 
attenuating these tendencies. On this basis, PKE offers a macroeconomic framework to 
analyse financial cycles and debt driven growth models.  
 
To what extent can the growth models in Table 1 be identified in the European context? Hein 
(2013) provides a systematic classification which identifies peripheral European countries as 
exhibiting the debt-driven growth model. While the level of household debt has been 
traditionally low in these countries, the increase in household debt has grown rapidly. Indeed, 
Table 2 shows that the increase in household debt in the southern European countries was not 
only above the increase in the northern European countries (with the exception of the 
Netherlands), but it also exceeded that of the USA and the UK. Stockhammer and Wildauer 
(2016) provide econometric evidence for the role of debt and property prices in determining 
private consumption and residential investment. The rapid expansion of credit was made 
possible to a significant extent through European financial integration, with policies aimed at 
creating a single financial market for Europe (Grahl 2009). This lead to massive capital flows 
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from Germany but also France and the UK to the peripheral European countries which soon 
fuelled an unsustainable property boom.  
 
Table 2. Increase in household debt (in % GDP), 2000-08 
Northern European Countries Anglo-Saxon Countries 
Germany  -11.3 USA 26 
Netherlands  32.8 United Kingdom 28.1 
Austria 7.9 Southern European Countries 
France 15.8 Ireland 62.7 
  Greece 35.5 
  Spain 33.8 
  Portugal 27.4 
Source: Eurostat, except USA: FoF   
 
The rapid increases in private (and, in the case of Greece, public) debt can hence be 
interpreted as a consequence of neoliberal economic policies involving financial deregulation 
and increasing inequality. At the same time, neoliberalism also provided the blueprints for the 
monetary and fiscal policy architecture of the European Monetary Union which is 
fundamentally aimed at constraining the ability of both nation states and the European 
institutions to intervene macroeconomically. The basic structure of this architecture can be 
summarised as follows: First, fiscal policy is essentially national policy. The EU budget, 
restricted to 2% of GDP, is too small and too inflexible to serve a macroeconomic function 
and cannot provide a counter-cyclical stimulus. Second, national fiscal policies are restricted 
in the short term as the budget deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP (except in severe 
recessions) and they must aim at a balanced budget in the medium term. Third, monetary 
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policy is centralized at the EU level and is targeting inflation, with the independent ECB 
having set the inflation target close to or below 2%. Fourth, financial markets are liberalized, 
internally as well as externally. Thus the EU foregoes instruments of controlling credit 
growth or allocating credit. Fifth, there was a no bail-out clause, stating that neither other 
national governments nor the ECB will support individual countries which are facing 
problems in financing themselves. This meant that when the financial crisis erupted, the fiscal 
and monetary policy regime acted to transform it into a sovereign debt crisis in those 
economies which were hit hardest. 
 
Prior to the crisis, and on the back of a uniform monetary policy which appeared to be 
tailored to the needs of the large core economies rather than the peripheral countries, the 
southern European countries experienced substantially higher price and wage inflation as 
well as faster growth than the north. These price and wage developments can contribute to an 
explanation of the substantial current account deficits which emerged in the south and which 
were mirrored by export surpluses in the north. However, we shall demonstrate in the next 
section that there are differing views on the relative importance of price-competitiveness and 
demand-booms respectively in explaining the trade imbalances, and also on the centrality of 
trade imbalances to explaining the Euro crisis. 
 
3 The causes and significance of European trade imbalances: The controversy around 
labour costs 
The role of price competitiveness, and especially the importance of divergent trends in unit 
labour costs (ULC) in explaining European trade imbalances has been a subject of 
controversy among both heterodox and orthodox economists. While some analysts regard 
divergence in competitiveness as an important (or, in extreme cases, seemingly the only) 
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determinant for current account imbalances, others have questioned whether price 
competitiveness, and in particular trends in ULC, can explain any significant part of trade 
imbalances.  This debate cuts across the orthodox/heterodox divide in that proponents and 
opponents of the view that ULC are an important factor can be found on both sides. However, 
even when they agree on the importance (or irrelevance) of ULC, heterodox and orthodox 
authors often derive very different policy implications. Importantly, one’s stance on this issue 
will have implications both for proposals to resolve the current crisis as well as for one’s 
assessment of the long-term viability of the common currency, making this an interesting 
debate worthwhile of examination.  
 
There is a long-standing stream in post-Keynesian, in particular among German-speaking 
PKs, which regards cost competitiveness as an important driver of external balances. 
Germany has a long tradition of export-orientation and has long used European currency 
arrangements to achieve a real under-valuation of its currency (e.g. Thomasberger 1995). For 
example, Priewe rejects the interpretation of the Euro crisis as related to government 
profligacy and instead regards “the key problem […] in the polarized current account 
balances, which reflect divergent competitiveness of members” (Priewe 2011, 1). Priewe thus 
calls for wage coordination in Europe. Mazier and Petit (2013), though less explicit, also 
regard cost divergence as the prime reason for current account imbalances and are concerned 
about the lack of nominal exchange adjustments in a currency union. They discuss a fiscal 
transfers and proposal that effectively suspends the currency union as possible solutions.  
 
In a series of papers, Stockhammer argues that current account positions depend on 
competitiveness as well as on relative demand developments. Europe has seen the emergence 
of two neoliberal growth models, a debt-driven, southern European and Anglo-Saxon model 
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based on growing household debt and an export-driven, northern European model. It is the 
interaction of these that gave rise to current account imbalances. Stockhammer and 
Sotiropoulos (2014) estimate a fixed effect model for a panel of Euro members from 1999 to 
2011 and find that ULC as well as demand have statistically significant effects on current 
account balances. Stockhammer (2011, 2016b) argues that imbalances have been due to wage 
suppression core countries such as Germany exhibit, as well as due to debt-driven growth in 
peripheral European countries. Samarina and Bezemer (2014) provide evidence that credit 
growth was to a large extent driven by capital inflows but do not offer a rigorous explanation 
of current account balances.  
 
However, there is also a strand within the PK literature which challenges the view that ULC 
is an important determinant of trade balances. Storm and Naastepad, the most prominent 
representatives of this view argue that the labour-cost argument is based on a narrow view of 
competition, that is, price competition. Labour costs are only a small part of overall costs, 
typically accounting for less than a quarter of manufacturing gross output price, and structural 
factors like the technology content of exports and the trade partners’ growth performance 
play a more important role. Storm and Naastepad (2015a) contend that Germany’s 
technological capability is a better explanation for its export performance. Using quarterly 
data from 1996-2008, they find that relative unit labour costs is not a significant determinant 
of Germany’s import share growth, export growth or trade balance. In a panel of Euro 
countries from 1995-2008, Storm and Naastepad (2015b) find that imports are insensitive to  
relative ULC while exports are sensitive to world income growth but less so to labour costs. 
They claim (without econometric evidence) that capital flows have more explanatory power 
for the current account deficits in the Eurozone periphery. Storm and Naastepad (2015b) 
show that Greece, Italy and Portugal specialise in low tech exports and their markets that 
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grow slowly. They argue that this is where the real problem of competition lies and that 
changes in labour costs cannot solve this problem.  
 
It is not straightforward to reconcile Storm and Naastepad’s findings with econometric 
evidence that support the role of relative costs, both on the mainstream side (e.g. Arghyrou 
and Chortareas 2008, Belke and Dreger 2011, Berger and Nitsch 2010) and on the PK side 
(Hein and Vogel 2008, Onaran and Galanis 2014, Stockhammer and Wildauer 2016). First, 
there are numerous differences in specifications, control variables, estimation technique and 
the sample. To illustrate, much of the literature uses nominal ULC or real ULC, Storm and 
Naastepad use relative ULC in their estimations. Time samples differ. Future research should 
try to assess their importance. Secondly, Storm and Naastepad do not question a statistically 
significant partial effect of overall costs. They merely contend that ULC are of limited 
practical importance. In McClosekey’s and Ziliak’s (1995) terminology, their argument is 
about economic, not statistical significance. However, the magnitudes of their economic 
results certainly conflict with those derived from theoretically similar models by Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) and Stockhammer and Sotiropoulos (2014). A theoretical problem with the 
Storm and Naastepad’s argument is that their reasoning regarding the small share of ULC in 
output prices relates to direct labour costs in each separate line of production, disregarding 
any indirect labour costs embodied in intermediate inputs. This means that the expected 
ULC-elasticities of output prices they derive from this exercise should be biased downward.  
 
Another strand of the heterodox literature focuses narrowly on the aspect of price 
competitiveness, with the effects of financialisation and credit-booms stressed in the work of 
Stockhammer and other PKs being rather secondary. An influential statement of these views 
has been produced by Flassbeck and Lapavitsas (2013). The argument is that a currency 
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union with a common inflation target requires that wages in all member countries grow in 
line with this target. Otherwise, current account imbalances will arise which will eventually 
lead to crises, although the mechanism which actually triggers the crisis is left rather vague. 
In this view, a resolution must come through realignment of ULC. Southern economies 
substantially overshot the defined wage target at the same time as core economies (especially 
Germany) undershot it before the crisis, meaning that both must adjust. Marxist explanations 
of the Eurocrisis in general are largely in line with this story, focussing on the role of ‘neo-
mercantilist’ German wage-suppression in a regime of fixed exchange rates (e.g. Bellofiore et 
al. 2011). In contrast with the PK account, Marxist explanations appear to implicitly assume a 
profit-led demand regime. A problem with these stories is that even if one accepts the alleged 
primacy of relative ULC in determining trade balances, the theory lacks an explanation of 
why economic growth in the deficit countries consistently exceeded that of the surplus 
countries. In addition, the sole focus of some contributions on relative ULC leads to a less 
comprehensive explanation of the Euro crisis. Lapavitsas (2015a,b) concludes from this 
analysis that a breakup of the Eurozone or at least the exit of deficit countries is the best 
solution to the Euro zone’s woes. 
 
A macroeconomically similar argument is made by proponents of the Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC) approach. They also regard ULC as the key variable in explaining the Euro crisis, but 
identify differences in wage bargaining coordination and their ability to restrain wage growth 
as the key for explaining the crisis (Hall 2012, Johnston et al 2014). Northern countries with 
coordinated wage bargaining systems were able to maintain competitiveness; southern 
countries with less coordinated wage bargaining systems experienced a loss of 
competitiveness. There is little role for demand developments and financialisation in this 
story. Ultimately it regards a fixed exchange rate system and excessive wage growth in the 
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service sectors in the southern European countries as the root of the crisis. Proponents of this 
view are similarly sceptical about the viability of the Eurozone. 
 
Similar arguments, yet with very different policy conclusions, have been put forward by 
some orthodox economists. They have pointed to the loss of competitiveness of peripheral 
countries as an important factor whilst regarding the corresponding gain in competitiveness 
of core economies as less of a problem. Sinn (2014b; see also Sinn and Valentinyi 2013) 
views the loss of competitiveness in peripheral economies as an important cause of the crisis 
and broadly supports the view that adjustment must mainly come from their side. He holds 
that this should be achieved through austerity and internal devaluation. Sinn (2014a, p. 11) 
also believes that any necessary adjustment for the surplus countries can be attained by 
relying on market forces, since “[a]fter years of extensive and excessive capital exports to the 
southern countries, investors from the north now have realised their mistake and look more 
towards investment in the home harbour”. The European institutions have frequently 
expressed similar views (Draghi 2012; Juncker 2015b; European Commission 2011), arguing 
that along with unsustainable fiscal policies, large losses of competitiveness in the peripheral 
economies were a root cause of the crisis. This serves as a justification of the current policies 
aimed at fiscal austerity and internal devaluation and is the underlying rationale for the Euro 
Plus Pact as well as the Five President’s Report (Juncker 2015a) in which the introduction of 
‘Competitiveness Authorities’ to control wage growth plays a major role. This account also 
diverts attention from the problematic EMU policy regime as such, which as we shall argue is 
the key to explaining the crisis and now acts as a drag on recovery.  
 
Some other mainstream economists have, however, taken a different view of the Eurozone 
crisis. They question both the relevance of divergences in competitiveness in causing the 
15 
 
current account imbalances and the usefulness of ULC as a proxy for competitiveness. For 
instance, Diaz Sanchez and Varoudakis (2013) argue that the current account imbalances 
cannot satisfactorily be explained through changes in price-competitiveness and provide 
empirical evidence suggesting that financial integration, leading to demand booms in the 
periphery was a more important factor. Wyplosz (2013) concurs with this view, arguing that 
causality runs from excessive demand, caused by financial integration and resulting in current 
account deficits, to divergences in competitiveness via differences in inflation rates. Gabrisch 
and Staehr (2014) find that the emergence of current account imbalances preceded the 
divergences in relative ULC. Wyplosz (2013) also contends that the use of ULC as 
commonly practised may be misleading. Firstly, aggregate ULC contain both the unit labour 
costs of the traded and the non-traded sector, and may understate the competitiveness of the 
traded sector. Secondly the comparison with Germany may be misleading since the deficit 
countries do not directly compete with Germany in most markets and have different trade 
patterns so that the basis of comparison should differ. Thirdly, the common indexing of ULC 
which uses the introduction of the Euro as the base year implicitly assumes that exchange 
rates were in equilibrium when the Euro was adopted. A problem with these mainstream 
arguments is that while they can explain current account deficits without having to resort to 
price competitiveness, they do not provide a compelling alternative explanation of the current 
account surpluses in the core economies. This is in contrast to heterodox views which also 
stress the role of wages in domestic demand formation. Despite his differing view on the role 
of ULC, Wyplosz essentially reaches the same policy conclusion as other mainstream 
authors, namely that excessive demand in the periphery must be curbed, i.e. that austerity is 
necessary, the only difference being that the element of wage cuts is absent.  
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Proponents as well as opponents of the hypothesis that current account imbalances have been 
cost driven can thus be found on both sides of the orthodox-heterodox divide. Our discussion 
also indicated that this debate carries important political implications. Table 3 therefore 
presents an overview of the various approaches discussed above as well as the differing 
policy conclusions associated with them.  
 
Table 3. Explanations of current account imbalances and policy recommendations 
 Inflationary 
adjustment in 
centre countries: 
higher wages and 
fiscal expansion 
Euro-exit for deficit 
countries or a 
dissolution of the 
Euro 
Internal devaluation 
and fiscal austerity in 
deficit countries 
Costs as prime 
determinant of current 
account imbalances; 
little role for demand 
Priewe (2012), 
Mazier and Petit 
(2013) 
Flassbeck and 
Lapavitsas (2013) 
Lapavitsas 
(2015a,b) 
Johnston et al 
(2014) 
European Commission 
(2011) 
Sinn and Valentinyi 
(2013) 
 
Costs and demand as 
important determinants 
of current account 
imbalances 
Stockhammer and 
Sotiropoulos 
(2014), 
Stockhammer 
(2016b) 
 
  
current account 
imbalances driven by 
demand developments, 
not costs 
Storm and 
Naastepad (2015a) 
 Diaz Sanchez & 
Varoudakis (2013) 
Gabrisch & Staehr 
(2014) 
Wyplosz (2013) 
 
Several observations emerge from our discussion. First, there is a surprising variability 
between analytical assessments and policy conclusions. For example, austerity in the deficit 
countries has been advocated by authors who argue that imbalances are cost driven (e.g. 
European Commission 2011) as well as by those who suggest that cost divergence did not 
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play a key role (e.g Wyplosz 2013).
2
 At the same time, authors arguing from different 
theoretical perspectives but stressing the cost-competitiveness view have come to greatly 
different policy conclusions, namely austerity and internal devaluation on the one hand (e.g. 
European Commission 2011), and exit or dissolution of the common currency on the other 
(e.g. Lapavitsas 2015a, b). Second, those authors who are critical of the common currency to 
the point of recommending a dissolution are usually those who view cost divergences as the 
prime cause of imbalances. The main exception to this are the writers belonging to the 
modern monetary theory (MMT) strand of PK, who will be discussed below.  
 
Regarding the outcome of the debate on the importance of cost-competitiveness, the 
empirical evidence remains inconclusive and the estimates by different authors are difficult to 
compare. However, authors arguing against the price-competitiveness view have pointed out 
some important limitations particularly of aggregate ULC as a proxy for competitiveness. 
They have stressed the non-price dimensions of competitiveness and the importance of 
different trade-patterns. As such, it appears likely that if this debate is to be resolved, further 
examination of less aggregated data will be an important area of research. Saltoglu and 
Yilmaz (2013), for instance, take a step in the right direction in examining the composition of 
the trade deficits of several peripheral economies as well as the German surplus by groups of 
products as well as by trade partners. In taking this approach further, one ought to be able to 
identify those groups of products for which ULC is an important determinant of 
competitiveness and those for which it is not and also what impact internal devaluation or 
revaluation would have on intra-European trade imbalances.  
                                                 
2
 In the case of Wyplosz, however, austerity seems even less viable than in the European Commission’s case, 
since it is not obvious how austerity should eliminate structural current account imbalances, unless demand is to 
be kept depressed permanently. 
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While, as we have seen, PK writers can be found on both sides of the debate, there exists 
common ground among the PK participants of this debate on the importance of credit-led 
booms in driving trade imbalances as well as on the proposition that changes in the wage 
share, regardless of whether or not they have a direct impact on the current account through 
cost-competitiveness, are an important factor in driving changes in effective demand and thus 
exert income effects on the trade balance since wages are not only a cost, but also a source of 
expenditure. This dimension is largely ignored in mainstream treatments of the problem. For 
PKs sceptical of the role of labour costs, policy prescriptions include the necessity of 
industrial policies to lead to a convergence of productive structures, financial regulation, and 
a correction of the obvious problems with the monetary and fiscal policy regimes. These 
recommendations are, by and large, shared by those post-Keynesians who do admit a role for 
costs. Post-Keynesians on both sides of the debate generally tend to favour a reform rather 
than a dissolution of the Eurozone and are united in their rejection of the neoliberal EMU 
policy regime. One of the reasons for this is that in general (exceptions include e.g. Cesaratto 
2015), and in contrast to, for instance, the views of Flassbeck and Lapavitsas (2013) current 
account imbalances are not viewed as the central element to explaining the Euro crisis. In 
principle, a financial crisis could have arisen in Europe even in the absence of large trade 
imbalances - though in practice these were one important reason for increasing debt levels in 
peripheral economies - and the key to understanding why the financial crisis turned into a 
sovereign debt crisis lies in the restrictive monetary and fiscal policy regime.  
 
The key point of this discussion is that contrary to the claim made by Baldwin and Giavazzi 
(eds., 2015), there is no consensus narrative on the Eurozone crisis. Indeed, there is not even 
consensus on what caused the current account imbalances preceding it, and neither on 
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whether these are central to an explanation of the crisis. Baldwin and Giavazzi claim that they 
are, but we shall argue next that the flawed EMU policy architecture is far more important 
and hold the key to understanding the sovereign debt crisis. 
 
4 The crisis and the EU policy regime 
In the USA the global financial crisis was countered by moderate counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy and by aggressive unconventional monetary policy (or quantitative easing), resulting 
in a weak recovery. Economic policy in Europe was less anti-cyclical. While countries 
adopted stimulus packages in 2008/09, from 2010 fiscal policy turned to austerity and, worse, 
it became most restrictive in the peripheral countries that were hardest hit by the crisis due to 
the large debt overhangs existing there. Stockhammer et al. (forthcoming) use estimates of 
regime-dependent fiscal multipliers to calculate the demand effects of fiscal policy since the 
beginning of the crisis for several European countries. They find that the switch to fiscal 
austerity can explain a large portion of the deep downturns these countries have been 
experiencing during the sovereign debt crisis. By contrast, the neural or mildly expansionary 
fiscal stances of core or non-euro economies such as Germany or the US can contribute to an 
explanation of the recoveries in these countries. Monetary policy in the EU tried to avoid 
quantitative easing as long as it could, but as the Euro crisis deepened, the ECB did expand 
its balance sheet. However, this strategy so far does not seem to be sufficient to stimulate 
growth, underscoring the importance and primacy of fiscal policy particularly during deep 
downturns. Given the different growth models and differences in economic policy, the crisis 
led to sharply different performances across Europe: a fragile recovery in the north and a 
depression in the southern European countries. 
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Nevertheless, the EU’s policy package has not changed direction, but become, as of today, 
more rigid and doctrinaire. The Treaty for Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) has tightened the grip on fiscal policy (Grahl 2012). 
Constitutional debt breaks are to be introduced in the Euro member states; there will be an 
automatic obligation to austerity if public debt exceeds the 60% target and the European 
Commission will be involved in the national budget process (the European Semester). The 
recent five Presidents’ report (Juncker 2015a) reaffirms these commitments. The one area 
where there has been a change in direction is with respect to the no bail-out clause. The EU 
has, belatedly, set up a collective fund for member states that have lost access to market 
finance (EFSF, EMF). This fund gives loans to the countries that are misleadingly referred to 
as ‘rescue packages’ and imposes conditionality that is similar in spirit (if not as far reaching) 
to IMF adjustment programmes. The ECB has also found (overall insufficient) ways to 
circumvent its statute in practice, but there is no indication that a formal change of the ECB’s 
role is being contemplated. 
 
The policy response to the Euro crisis hence very much reflects the stance of the European 
institutions on the debate examined in the previous section. If one views the crisis primarily 
as an outcome of fiscal profligacy and divergences in (price) competitiveness, austerity both 
in terms of government spending and in terms of wage cuts is the obvious response from a 
mainstream perspective. Parts of the mainstream economics profession have shifted their 
views on fiscal policy in the wake of the global financial crisis (Blanchard and Leigh 2013), 
and advocates of countercyclical fiscal policy, who may be termed mainstream Keynesians, 
have gained increasing prominence with their analyses of fiscal policy responses to the global 
financial crisis in general and the euro crisis in particular (e.g. Krugman 2012; de Grauwe 
and Ji 2013).  EU policy, however, still reflects the orthodoxy prevailing prior to 2008 
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according to which deficit spending is inherently ineffective and austerity can in fact produce 
growth. This latter view, the idea of ‘expansionary fiscal consolidation’ (Giavazzi and 
Pagano 1990) enjoyed its heyday prior to the crisis but has proved remarkably long-lived 
(Alesina and Ardagna 2009) despite being based on only a handful of questionable 
observations (Chowdhury and Islam 2012). Yet even on its own terms, the argument cannot 
be applied to the Eurozone periphery since the preconditions for an expansionary 
consolidation are most definitely not fulfilled in these economies (Bi et al. 2012).
3
 
Nevertheless, an alleviation of fiscal austerity remains a taboo in Brussels and Berlin. 
Similarly, wages continue to be viewed solely as a cost factor with their role in demand 
formation, which is the theoretical foundation of the concept of wage-led growth, being 
ignored. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that only wage reductions can bring an 
increase in employment. That view is borne out in the single minded focus the European 
institutions put on competitiveness in terms of wage costs, with the planned ‘National 
Competitiveness Authorities’ (Juncker 2015a) being aimed at convergence to the ‘best’ 
performances, i.e. the lowest prevailing standards in terms of wage settlements. 
 
The PK opinion on internal devaluation, based on the conclusions drawn from empirical 
research on demand regimes, has already been outlined above and is shared universally 
among within the school. Given the empirical finding that the Eurozone as a whole is in a 
wage-led regime, generalised downward pressure on wages is likely to have the opposite 
                                                 
3
 These preconditions include that a consolidation must be expected to be based on tax increases but actually 
turn out to be spending-based, and that expansionary monetary policy can compensate for any contractionary 
effects. Since consolidations in the European periphery were from the outset planned to be based largely on 
spending cuts and since monetary policy is already highly expansionary without great effects, an expansionary 
consolidation seems highly unlikely even on the theory’s own terms. 
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effect to that intended by EU policy. As regards fiscal policy, the crisis has illustrated the 
strong interdependence of the government sector and the financial system. Mainstream 
economics, but also Marxist Political Economy, regard money as emerging from private 
transactions. By contrast, PK theory and economic sociology stress that debt relations and in 
particular government debt and the ability of governments to collect taxes in their own 
currency are the foundation of money (Goodhart 1998; Graeber 2011 chapters 2 and 3). 
Ingham (2004) emphasises the state origin of money, but highlights that the social mode of 
production of credit money is through private banks. Money thus has sovereign power as a 
constituent element, but private institutions are critically involved. This balance between the 
state and the private sector in the creation of money has been upset by the EMU, which 
separated fiscal and monetary spaces and insulated the European Central Bank from national 
governments. Central bank independence was strengthened and the ECB was forbidden to 
fund governments directly. By design it was meant to be a lender of last resort for the private 
sector only.  
 
Marxist economists in practice, despite their differing and often somewhat eclectic views on 
the nature of money, tend to agree with the PK case for fiscal policy effectiveness (Lapavitsas 
2015b) but also doubt its ability to offset tendencies for capitalist crises in the long run (Kotz 
2010). This is reflected in their assessment of the Euro crisis outlined above, in which ULC 
and trade imbalances are central, with less emphasis on the role of the EU fiscal and 
monetary policy regime. Marxists also tend to assume that economies are profit-led, meaning 
that there is no clear-cut economic case against internal devaluation from this perspective. 
While wage-cuts may be viewed as socially undesirable, it is not clear why they should not 
eventually result in a recovery. In this case, the only alternative to internal devaluation would 
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be an exit from the single currency since devaluation could then take place through an 
independent currency, lessening the burden on workers.  
 
The crisis is, in our view, ultimately due to the neoliberal economic policy regime that has 
forced countries in recession to impose austerity and has seriously damaged the ability of 
nation states to counter an economic crisis, by making central bank backing conditional on 
fiscal policy conditionality. The restrictions on fiscal policy directly impede governments on 
the expenditure side. In particular it has forced those countries most desperately in need of 
expansionary fiscal policies to pursue austerity. The loss of monetary sovereignty means that 
countries cannot set interest rates and, more importantly in times of sovereign debt crisis, 
they do not have the lender of last resort facility to support the government. The public 
finances of Eurozone countries are hence subject to financial market pressures and 
speculation by the very same institutions which had earlier been bailed out. All these 
dysfunctional features of the European economic regime are not an accident, but a part of the 
neoliberal agenda of subjecting states to market discipline.  
 
While our story is bleak one, given the dominance of neoliberalism in European policy 
making, it also suggests a series of reforms that could overcome the crisis without the need 
for a breakup. Policies, both related to wage costs and productive structures, to eliminate 
current account imbalances in an inflationary rather than a deflationary fashion would be 
desirable, but it is reform of the fiscal and monetary policy regime which would strike at the 
heart of the problem. While the need for a reform of the fiscal and monetary policy 
framework of the Eurozone seems to be gaining increasing acceptance within the economics 
profession, the field is certainly far from having reached a consensus position both on the 
need for and the design of such a reform. Additionally, there is little evidence that European 
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institutions (or the German finance ministry) have any desire to rethink its policy framework. 
The next section will,by way of conclusion, briefly outline the general features of a PK 
reform of the Eurozone and contrast it with ideas closer to the mainstream. 
 
5 A post-Keynesian policy package for the Eurozone 
The common currency turned what would otherwise have been an exchange rate crisis into a 
sovereign debt crisis. The separation of monetary and fiscal space fatally weakened the 
ability to counteract the crisis. The set of rules effectively leaves few policy variables at the 
states’ availability and encourages a wage policy that aims at competitive devaluation. 
Wages, for better or worse, are left as the adjusting variable. At the root of the crisis is a 
build-up of debt, fuelled by financialisation and, in this particular case, manifesting itself in 
demand booms underlying the debt-driven and export-driven variants of neoliberal growth 
models and reflecting current account imbalances. However, the key to explaining the crisis 
does not lie in explaining these imbalances, but rather the flaws of the EMU policy 
architecture which differentiate the Eurozone from economies such as the UK and the USA 
which similarly experienced debt-fuelled booms and financial crises, but did not suffer a 
sovereign debt crisis since they possess less dysfunctional fiscal and monetary policy 
regimes. 
 
The financial crisis escalated in Europe because fiscal policy and monetary policy were less 
anti-cyclical than in Anglo-Saxon countries. The crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis in 
southern Europe because of the separation of monetary and fiscal spaces, or in other words 
the treaty-consistent refusal of the ECB to back the governments of the EU member states. 
This is an explanation on which, we believe, most PKs, regardless of their views on the 
importance of ULC in determining trade balances can agree. PKs from the MMT strand, in 
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line with their theoretical perspective which stresses the importance of monetary sovereignty 
also put this aspect at the centre of their discussions of the Eurozone, arguing that the loss of 
monetary sovereignty of Eurozone member states in combination with a non-existent 
European fiscal policy and a restrictive ECB mandate account for the severity of the crisis. 
However, in contrast to our policy recommendations, followers of MMT tend to be more 
favourable toward and relaxed about a potential break-up of the Eurozone or the exit of 
individual members (Wray 2011) than European PKs who generally favour a reformed 
Eurozone along the lines described below.  
 
Europe faces several challenges: it has to stimulate demand, address high private and public 
debt and ideally also eliminate trade imbalances. A strategy to eliminate trade imbalances 
should combine insights from both post-Keynesian camps on the ULC debate. Wage policy 
should not aim at wage flexibility and internal devaluation as recommended by the EU 
institutions and mainstream advocates of the cost-competitiveness view, but at an equitable 
income distribution and, especially in those countries with weak domestic demand (such as 
Germany), inflationary growth and domestic demand formation. This requires a strengthening 
of collective bargaining structures and ought to be complemented by a European system of 
national minimum wages (Schulten and Watt 2007). The macroeconomic aim of European 
wage coordination ought to be higher wage growth in the trade surplus countries which 
would help prevent imbalances both by stimulating demand in surplus countries and, to the 
extent that imbalances are caused by this factor, by bringing relative costs in line. At the same 
time, deficit countries require large amounts of productive investment and an industrial 
policy aimed at the upgrading of productive structures to eliminate structural trade 
imbalances which cannot be eliminated by any amount of internal devaluation in deficit 
countries or internal revaluation in surplus countries. Of course, these measures, especially 
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those aimed at technological upgrading, would only be effective in the longer run. Some PKs 
hold that the elimination of trade imbalances and their underlying causes (which by them are 
seen to be chiefly divergences in ULC) are imperative for solving the difficulties faced by the 
Eurozone (Cesaratto 2015). In some cases, this appears to lead to the conclusion that an exit 
from the Euro, followed by currency devaluations for the deficit countries may be the best 
option (Vernengo 2015). Others have argued that the flawed monetary and fiscal policy 
setup, especially the lack of monetary sovereignty of member states (Lavoie 2015) and the 
power of the financial sector (Wray 2012), are the major reason for the crisis, leading to a 
lengthy discussion of whether or not the Euro crisis should be interpreted as a balance of 
payments crisis. Without delving too deeply into this debate, we would contend that while it 
is true that the current crisis resembles a balance of payments crisis in many respects, this 
does not imply that the Eurozone’s problems could be solved through ensuring that no current 
account imbalances emerge in the future. The flawed fiscal and monetary policy regimes 
would still leave the Eurozone exceptionally vulnerable to financial crises even in the 
absence of trade imbalances. Thus, as we have argued above, the most pressing issue is a 
reform of the fiscal and monetary policy regimes and regulation of the financial sector.  
 
Thus, a post-Keynesian policy package must free fiscal policy from the shackles of the 
present regime. Fiscal policy has to be used to ensure that aggregate demand is at a level to 
ensure full employment. This implies a strong counter-cyclical component. Part of this can be 
delivered by automatic stabilisers but a substantial part must be discretionary policy. States 
need to be able to react if their economy is facing a recession or high unemployment. In the 
current environment, this means that the southern European countries should see large 
increases in government spending, both to raise employment and to undertake productive 
investment aimed at technological upgrading rather than fiscal austerity aimed at permanently 
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depressing effective demand. Ideally these expenditures would come out of a European 
budget, but the current stance of the European institutions provides little hope for anything 
going beyond a restricted system of automatic stabilisers at the European level (Juncker 
2015a).  To guarantee that financial crises never again escalate into sovereign debt crises, the 
ECB’s mandate must be reformed to ensure monetary backing for fiscal policies, regardless 
of whether they take place at the national or European level.  
 
Lastly, the financial sector needs to be restructured and contracted. An inflationary 
environment would facilitate reducing private and public debt levels, but debt restructuring 
will in some cases be necessary to make debt manageable. To counteract the regressive 
distributional effects of bank rescues, a substantial wealth tax would have to be introduced. 
Bailed-out financial institutions would be put under public control to ensure change in 
management practises. Monetary policy should be reoriented away from single-minded 
inflation targeting, which was long advocated by the mainstream yet is based on questionable 
evidence (Bibow 2010), and instead lean against asset price bubbles using a richer set of 
macro-prudential instruments, e.g. asset-specific reserve requirements to control destabilising 
credit growth and capital flows. Through the measures outlined above, the common currency 
could be preserved and placed on a sustainable foundation. It remains to be seen whether the 
PK analysis its policy recommendations as presented, which differ significantly from the 
alleged consensus on the Eurozone crisis presented by Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015), will 
manage to have any impact on the future direction of the EMU.  
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